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1962] RECENT DECISIONS 827 
TORTS-LIBEL-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RETRACTION STATUTE ELIMINAT-
ING GENERAL DAMAGES REcoVERY-Following publication of allegedly li-
belous statements made by defendants during a televised news broadcast, 
plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages. Defendants' motion to 
strike the allegations of general and punitive damages was granted by the 
trial court since the complaint did not allege that defendants intended to 
defame plaintiff, or that defendants refused to publish a requested re-
traction of a non-intentional libel, both of which are conditions precedent 
to recovery of such damages under the Oregon statute.1 Plaintiff failed 
to plead further and judgment was entered for defendants. On appeal to 
the Oregon Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The plaintiff's failure to com-
1 ORE. REv. STAT, § 30.160 (1955) which provides: 
"(l) In an action for damages on account of a defamatory statement published or 
broadcast in a newspaper, magazine, other printed periodical, or by radio, television or 
motion pictures, the plaintiff shall not recover general damages unless: (a) A correction 
or retraction is demanded but not published as provided in ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.165; or 
(b) The plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant actually 
intended to defame the plaintiff. (2) Where the plaintiff is entitled to recover general 
damages, the publication of a correction or retraction may be considered in mitigation 
of damages." 
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ply with the statute for general damages recovery was fatal to the cause 
of action, and the substitution of a retraction for an allowance of general 
damages does not violate the Oregon Constitution or the fourteenth amend-
ment of the federal constitution.2 Holden v. Pioneer Broadcasting Co., 365 
P.2d 845 (Ore. 1961). 
At common law it was generally held that a plaintiff defamed by libel 
may recover general damages-presumed injury to reputation-without 
pleading or proving actual damage.3 However, with the exception of cer-
tain categories of imputation, it has been held that where extrinsic facts 
are necessary to prove the imputation conveyed, such libel "per quod" is 
not actionable without proof of special damages-actual injury to reputa-
tion.4 But where the plaintiff can recover general damages, a retraction by a 
publisher precludes an allowance of punitive damages absent actual malice, 
and such retraction may also be shown in mitigation of general damages.Ii 
The recent advent and rapid growth of various types of mass communi-
cation media has created a need for new and appropriate rules of law, 
both substantive and procedural, in the defamation area.6 Common law 
libel doctrines, complicated by problems of strict liability,7 chain liability,8 
2 The statute was attacked as violating the equal protection clause of article I, § 20, 
of the Oregon Constitution, and the equal protection and due process clauses of the 
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The central point of 
attack was upon article I, § 10, of the Oregon Constitution which states: "Every man 
shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property 
or reputation." The court in upholding the statute held in reference to article I, § 10, 
that the legislature can modify or limit remedies consistent with the Oregon Constitu-
tion, and even if not, a retraction is a substantial equivalent of general damages. 
3 PRossER, TORTS § 93 (2d ed. 1955). See generally Veeder, History and Theory of the 
Law of Defamation (pts. 1-2), 3 CoLuM. L. REv. 546 (1903); 4 id. 33 (1904); Comment, 
69 HARV. L. R.Ev. 875 (1956). 
4 See authorities cited note 3 supra. 
5 See, e.g., Turner v. Hearst, 115 Cal. 394, 47 Pac. 129 (1896); Mcyerle v. Pioneer 
Publishing Co., 45 N.D. 568, 178 N.W. 792 (1920); Webb v. Call Publishing Co., 173 
Wis. 45, 180 N.W. 263 (1920). 
6 See Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors in the Press, 60 HARv. L. REv. 1 
(1946); Donnelly, The Law of Defamation; Proposals for Reform, 33 MINN. L. REv. 609 
(1949). 
7 Hulton &: Co. v. Jones, [1909] 2 K.B. 444, affirmed, [1910] A.C. 20. Sec PROSSER, 
TORTS § 94 (2d ed. 1955). Closely related is liability imposed for repeating a defamation. 
The principal case is a good example, as the defendant television station published a 
grand jury report in a news broadcast. See principal case at 846. See, e.g., W'ood v. 
Constitution Publishing Co., 57 Ga. App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937), afj'd mem., 187 Ga. 
377, 200 S.E. 131 (1938) (defendant liable for publishing press agency dispatches); Atkin-
son v. Detroit Free Press Co., 46 Mich. 341, 9 N.W. 501 (1881) (liability resulted from 
publishing opinion of third person). In Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 2 N.J. 393, 66 A.2d 
869 (1949), the defendant newspaper quoted an assistant prosecutor who made defama-
tory statements, and although accurate and fairly reported without malice, the court 
held defendant liable. 
s A cause of action at common law arises for each publication of the defamatory 
statement to each different person. As this proved too harsh when applied to mass 
news media, a doctrine was developed that an entire edition of a newspaper or a 
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and the possibility of extortionate suits, when added to the ever-present 
difficulty of measuring damages,9 have served as an effective deterrent to 
the free dissemination of news to the public. Further highlighting the pre-
carious position of a publisher has been the fact that even the exercise 
of due care would not always prevent the publication of defamatory state-
ments, from which liability followed.1° As a result, many state legislatures 
have enacted retraction statutes11 which provide a substitutionary remedy 
for general damages, thereby precluding the application of the otherwise 
onerous general damages burden thrust upon news publishers for unin-
tentional libels. But when state legislatures have so acted, the state courts 
have usually either held the statutes invalid as unconstitutional12 or 
interpreted them to permit recovery of all but punitive damages,13 thereby 
frustrating the manifest legislative policy. For example, in Minnesota 
where a retraction statute was upheld, it was held to apply only if the 
defendant proved that the libel was published in good faith, a term inter-
preted to mean freedom from fault, including negligence.14 The principal 
case follows the affirmative path set by Werner v. Southern Cal. Associated 
Newspapers,15 which upheld a retraction statute in •the face of constitu-
magazine was to be regarded as a single publication for which only one cause of action 
would lie within a state. The significant limitation on the "single publication" rule, 
however, is that it does not cross a state line; hence, conceivably, one could have fifty 
causes of action. This presents the unsettled question of what law would apply to each 
cause of action. For a discussion of "chain libel" suits, see Prosser, Interstate Publications, 
51 MICH. L. REV. 959 (1953). 
9 See McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 117 (1935). 
10 See, e.g., Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 890 (W .D. Mo. 1934); 
Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933). See also Keller, Federal 
Control of Defamation by Radio, 12 NoTRE DAME LAw. 134, 154, 172 (1936); Vold, 
Defamation by Radio, 19 MINN. L. R.Ev. 6Il, 632 (1935). 
11 See Note, 36 ORE. L. R.Ev. 70, 71 (1956) for a complete classified list of retraction 
statutes by states. 
12 See, e.g., Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 Pac. 1041 (1904) (plaintiff deprived 
of a remedy without "due course of law" under Kansas constitution); Park v. Detroit 
Free Press Co., 72 ~Iiclt. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888) (denial of equal protection); Neafie v. 
Hoboken Printing &: Publishing Co., 75 N.J.L. 564, 68 Atl. 146 (1907) (legislature has 
no power to eliminate remedy for injured reputation); Byers v. Meridian Printing Co., 
84 Ohio 408, 95 N.E. 917 (1911) (plaintiff deprived of a remedy without due process of 
law). 
13 See, e.g., Comer v. Age Herald Publishing Co., 151 Ala. 613, 44 So. 673 (1907) in 
which a retraction statute which provided for a recovery of "actual damages" only after 
a retraction was construed to permit both general and special damages. Accord, Ross v. 
Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950); Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., 198 Mass. 538, 84 N.E. 
1018 (1908); Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904); Meyerle v. Pioneer 
Publishing Co., 45 N.D. 568, 178 N.W. 792 (1920). Cf. Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 13 
(1858), in which actual damages was construed to mean special damages but malice was 
held to encompass negligence as well as any wrongful state of mind. See note 1 supra. 
As to the "mangling" of retraction statutes by judicial interpretation, see Morris, Inad-
vertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 !LL. L. REv. 36 (1937). 
14 Allan v. Pioneer-Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 41 N.W. 936 (1889). 
15 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 910 (1951), 38 CALIF. 
L. R.Ev. 951 (1950). See also Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 252 (1950). 
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tional attacks. The California statute, though its coverage is not so broad,16 
went a step farther than the Oregon statute in question. In California, a 
retraction is a substitute for general and punitive damages in the case 
of deliberate and malicious as well as inadvertent libel.17 Thus, in those 
states where the constitutionality of the retraction statute has been upheld, 
and where they have been construed and applied without significant judi-
cial abrogation, the plaintiff is left with a right only to special damages--
actual pecuniary injury-in most cases impossible, or at least quite diffi-
cult, to prove, and to a retraction which may or may not be a suitable 
remedy for his damaged reputation. 
While the deterrent effect of a retraction statute may not be as strong 
as the threat of a law suit and subsequent financial loss,18 it offers significant 
advantages in the furtherance of truthful and comprehensive news report-
ing. For a retraction will, to the extent that the same audience sees it, 
promptly inform this segment of the public of the falsity or mistake of the 
original publication and therefore can arguably be more effective in re-
pairing the plaintiff's reputation than a less publicized damage recovery 
through litigation at a much later date. Moreover, retraction statutes, by 
encouraging the publication of retractions to avoid general damages re-
coveries, obviate the necessity of recourse to litigation to correct misstate-
ments.19 Without going so far as the California statute, which includes 
intentional libel, the Oregon statute seems to offer the best approach.20 
It facilitates a free dissemination of news by avoiding strict liability 
without fault as to publishers, and also provides protection for the 
individual's reputation by means of a published retraction or a damage 
action in the case of intentional defamation. Aside from the arguments 
for or against retraction statutes, the principal case indicates a relaxation 
16 CALIF. CIV. CoDE § 48(a) covers only newspapers and radio broadcasts whereas the 
Oregon retraction statute includes all media. See note 1 supra. 
17 CALIF. CIV. CoDE § 48(a). 
18 See Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 ILL. L. R.Ev. 36 (1937). 
Some would argue that the power of the press to destroy is too great, and that it can 
better bear the loss through libel insurance. See Libel Insurance, Bus. Week, June 8, 
1946, p. 61; Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 33 MINN. L. R.Ev. 
609 (1949). 
19 See Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors in the Press, 60 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1 
(1946). 
20 One writer has suggested a statutory right of reply is the best approach to provide 
a substitute remedy for general damages. See Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors 
in the Press, 60 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1 (1946). See, e.g., NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 200.570 (1960) which 
requires that a denial of a libelous article be published by any newspaper or periodical 
circulated within the state and failure to comply with the provisions of this section 
makes one subject to criminal penalties. The right of reply is not only subject to 
attack as to its feasibility, but it would not require the publisher to notify the public 
as to its falsity, and, in effect, the public would receive two sides to an alleged libel 
without knowing which is the correct view. A retraction, on the other hand, offers to 
the plaintiff tangible proof of the falsity of the libel for use in the future when con-
fronted with questions concerning his reputation. 
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of the judicial hostility which had characterized the nullification by the 
courts of retraction statutes enacted at the tum of the century, and a 
continuation of the trend started by Werner to uphold such remedial leg-
islative action. 
However, even with judicial acceptance of the retraction statute con-
cept, there remains a possibility of circumventing such statutes by resort 
to a different theory of tort liability, invasion of the right of privacy. Sev-
eral aspects of the right of privacy, namely public disclosure of private facts 
and the publication of facts which place one in a false light, also concern 
reputation. To this extent, similarities exist between libel and the right of 
privacy.21 Thus, in certain cases, the publication of a libel will offer the 
injured party a choice of remedies,22 which assumes importance since an 
invasion of privacy also permits a recovery of general damages, truth not 
being recognized as a defense.23 Perhaps the mere fact that feelings, peace 
of mind and privacy have been intruded upon by a libel, in addition to 
the injuries to reputation and character caused ·thereby, justifies recovery 
for an invasion of privacy.24 But this apparently inconsistent result, de-
pending on what theory the cause of action is based upon, would seemingly 
serve to nullify the objectives of the retraction statutes,25 at least in certain 
factual settings, and, as such, is somewhat undesirable. To preclude this 
anomaly, the better approach would be to construe retraction statutes as 
pre-empting the treatment of all defamatory statements in any theory of 
tort thus preventing a general damages recovery through claims of a vio-
lation of the right of privacy.26 
John W. Galanis 
21 See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960). Although the right of privacy 
has yet to be fully defined, Oregon has apparently recognized its existence in Hinish 
v. Meier &: Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P .2d 438 (1941). 
22 Plaintiff in the principal case conceivably might have used this theory of re-
covery. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Pavesick 
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Munden v. Harris, 153 
Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911), where counts of both libel and invasion of privacy 
were upheld. 
23 See, e.g., Reed v. Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Kerby 
v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942). See generally Green, 
The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1932); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 
(1960). 
24 One could argue that if libel really invades two different interests the law can 
provide a choice of two alternative remedies and to limit this choice on the ground of 
a public predisposition for the strictness of a libel action is not a proper judicial function. 
25 This development has apparently been used and accepted in California. See 
Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942). Compare Gill v. 
Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P .2d 441 (1953), with Gill v. Curtis Publishing 
Co,, 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P .2d 630 (1952). See Powsner, Libel in Limbo: Another Conquest 
for the Right of Privacy?, 30 L.A.B. BULL. 365 (1955). 
:la At least one court in dictum said that invasion of privacy was not a substitute 
remedy for a libel suit. Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 349, 174 S.W.2d 510, 
512 (1943). 
